Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?
Genocide Studies and Prevention, Vol. 4, No. 3.
By Alan J. Kuperman
Although most humanitarians advocate more international intervention in
Darfur, some analysts urge the opposite on grounds that intervention
has backfired due to the problem of moral hazard. These contrarians
argue that the expectation of benefiting from intervention is what
emboldens Darfur’s rebels to fight, which provokes state-sponsored
retaliation against their perceived civilian supporters, thereby
exacerbating and prolonging the humanitarian emergency. This article
tests the moralhazard hypothesis against four other potential
explanations for why Darfur’s militants launched and perpetuated their
rebellion despite being unable to protect their civilians from
genocidal retaliation. The evidence indicates that moral hazard—the
expectation of humanitarian intervention—increased both the magnitude
and duration of Darfur’s rebellion, and therefore the retaliation it
provoked against civilians. Competing hypotheses are less plausible but
cannot be ruled out completely based on available evidence. The article
explores the policy implications for intervention in Darfur and other
humanitarian emergencies, and offers suggestions for further research.
Read the article.
(Something interesting I found)Posted: Thursday, January 7, 2010