Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 4, pg. 423–443, 2009

Jamin Asay

Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account.

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(Something interesting I found)Posted: Friday, February 12, 2010 by nick stock
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