Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 4, pg. 423–443, 2009
Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and
practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments
of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability
to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the
metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the
two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is
not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of
truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical
adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why
deflationists cannot uphold such an account.
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(Something interesting I found)Posted: Friday, February 12, 2010