Why Information Ethics Must Begin With Virtue Ethics
Metaphilosophy, Volume 41, Issue 3, Pages 380 - 401
By Richard Volkman
The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in
the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is
antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to
Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments.
Drawing from disparate traditional sources like Aristotle, Nietzsche,
and Emerson, as well as contemporary advocates of virtue ethics like
Nussbaum, Foot, and Williams, the essay shows that the central
contentions of IE, including especially the principle of ontological
equality, must either express commitments grounded in the particular
perspectives we already inhabit, or be without rational or ethical
force for us.
Read the article.
(Something interesting I found)Posted: Monday, May 17, 2010