Why Information Ethics Must Begin With Virtue Ethics

Metaphilosophy, Volume 41, Issue 3, Pages 380 - 401

By Richard Volkman

The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments. Drawing from disparate traditional sources like Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Emerson, as well as contemporary advocates of virtue ethics like Nussbaum, Foot, and Williams, the essay shows that the central contentions of IE, including especially the principle of ontological equality, must either express commitments grounded in the particular perspectives we already inhabit, or be without rational or ethical force for us.

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(Something interesting I found)Posted: Monday, May 17, 2010 by cait
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