Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?
Educational Philosophy and Theory, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp. 397 - 409
In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a 'moral gap' has been
identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral
psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two
main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral
selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective.
The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the
self as 'identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I
propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves
Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity,
yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a
conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to
be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this
conception for moral education.
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(Something interesting I found)Posted: Tuesday, June 8, 2010