“Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism”
in Oxford Handbook on Skepticism, John Greco (ed.). OUP, 2008: 557-580.
This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. I argue that combining virtue epistemology and a "default and challenge" model as advocated by Michael Williams makes for stronger response to skepticism than either approach taken separately.
Au: Please spell out VE at its first use here, with the abbreviation in parentheses after the spelled-out term.
(My publication)Posted: Thursday, November 17, 2011